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Chapter 7
Governance and Investments
of Public Pensions
Michael Useem and David Hess
Retirement funds for public employees in the United States are scattered
among more than 2,500 public pension plans. States supervise some, but
local municipalities manage most; a few oversee more than $100 billion in
assets, while most husband less than $1 billion.
Unlike the U.S. Social Security system, state and local retirement systems
do not operate a pay-as-you-go scheme. Rather, they compile contributions
from both governments and participants and then invest the assets until the
capital and its gains are later distributed to those in retirement. Those in-
vestment decisions are overseen by a governing board, and in that body the
public has placed its trust. If trustees fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities,
they ensure thousands of public employees a comfortable retirement and
hundreds of public officials a balanced budget. If they do not, they furnish
neither employees nor taxpayers what they are due.
Many state and local systems have modified their governance practices
and investment strategies during the past decade, and many will surely con-
tinue to do so. In response to intensifying pressures for greater board ac-
countability, for instance, trustees have become more involved in allocating
their system's assets. And in response to surging stock markets in the United
States and expanding investment opportunities abroad, many have placed
more of those assets in equities and turned abroad. Public pension gover-
nance policies and their investment consequences should thus be viewed
dynamically, with the practices of many changing in response to shifting
political realities and market conditions.
In light ofa growing debate over whether to allow a part ofour national re-
tirement system to be managed in much the same way, the evolving govern-
ing practices of public pensions can provide a useful model for what public
officials do when they have authority over retiree monies. From observing
how state and local officials oversee, allocate, and invest their retirement
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assets, we might foresee how federal officials and trustees would behave if
social security assets were placed in their hands. From past practices we can
extract forecasts of future practices, and perhaps even best practices.
This chapter thus provides an analysis ofpublic pension governance prac-
tices and investment strategies for the practical lessons they contain not only
for policies of state and local systems, but also for anticipating what lies
ahead if our social security system were to adopt a policy of placing retire-
ment assets in capital markets.
Drawing on surveys of state and local systems during the 1990s, this chap-
ter is divided into five main sections. In the first, we track the evolving gov-
ernance practices from 1990 to 1996, and suggest where they are likely to
move during the next several years. In the second, we follow their invest-
ment strategies over the same period. In the third section, we analyze the
impact of the evolving governance practices on investment strategies. In
the fourth, we examine how the governing practices have led some pension
funds not only to buy stock in companies but also to render advice to them.
And in a final section, we consider how the governing practices have affected
the social and economic targeting of pension investments.
Sources of Information
We are fortunate to have good surveys of the nation's state and local retire-
ment systems for the years of 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, and 1996. The Pub-
lic Pension Coordinating Council conducted the studies, and it sought to
reach all of the major state and local systems in the United States. In 1996,
for instance, the participating systems covered 81 percent of all plan mem-
bers and held 81 percent of the $1.6 trillion under management by state and
local pension systems. Since public officials know that the council makes the
data on each fund available to the public, it is fair to assume that the re-
sponding officials perceived an incentive to furnish accurate and complete
information (England 1996; General Accounting Office 1996; Mitchell and
Carr 1996; Zorn 1998).
The number ofstate and local retirement systems participating in the sev-
eral surveys and their asset holdings are displayed in Table 1. Signifying the
highly skewed distribution of fund assets, the mean value of the holdings is
some 10 times the median value. Signifying the surging economy and exu-
berant stock market in the latter halfof the 1990s, the mean value of the as-
sets under management during this seven-year period soared by two-thirds.
Retirement System Investment Strategies
The trustees of state and local retirement systems serve as fiduciaries for
the beneficiaries' funds, but they have interpreted their duties in varying
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TABLE 1. Number and Average Assets of State and Local Retirement Systems,
1990-96
1990 1991 1992 1994 1996
No. of systems 202 325 291 310 261
Assets ($ millions)
Mean value $3,048 $2,497 $2,721 $3,115 $5,026
Median value 334 176 202 220 419
Source: Authors' calculations.
TABLE 2. Retirement System Governance Policies and Governing Board, 1990-96
Governance policies
(% of systems with policy) 1990 1991 1992 1994 1996
Investment restrictions in state
constitution 26.2 26.6 26.9 26.1 19.1
Board sets allocations n.a. n.a. 72.7 74.0 84.2
Board directly responsible for
investments 60.4 53.6 48.6 48.9 55.6
Independent investment
performance evaluation n.a. n.a. 70.6 80.3 86.2
Governing board (mean and standard deviation)
Number oftrustees 8.12 7.81 8.60 8.53 8.60
(3.23) (3.32) (3.70) (3.59) (3.57)
Plan participants as % of trustees 65.3 62.5 63.1 63.0 64.3
(24.2) (25.9) (25.9) (25.5) (25.2)
Elected trustees as % of trustees 34.7 33.6 32.1 33.2 35.1
(27.5) (26.9) (26.5) (25.4) (25.1)
Source: Authors' calculations.
fashion, as have the legislative bodies overseeing them. In some instances,
legislators have imposed rigid restrictions, while in most cases, none; some
boards actively guide investment strategies, others prefer passivity.
We focus on four key areas where legislative bodies and governing boards
set policy: (1) constitutional restrictions on investments, (2) independent an-
nual performance evaluations, (3) trustee involvement in setting policy on
investment allocations, and (4) direct trustee responsibility for investments.
We also examine three main characteristics of the governing board: (1) the
number of trustees, (2) the proportion of trustees that are participants in
the retirement plan, and (3) the fraction of the board that is elected by plan
members.
The trend evidence shown in Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 reveals wide-
spread policy changes among otherwise persistent board structures. Eight to
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Figure 1. Public pension fund governance policies. Source: Authors' calculations.
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Figure 2. Public pension fund governing board. Source: Authors' calculations.
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nine trustees sit on the typical board in both 1990 and 1996, a third ofthem
are elected by plan participants throughout this period, and two-thirds per-
sonally participate in the retirement system over which they preside. They
have evolved their practices, however, toward greater trustee engagement in
investment allocations and more widespread use of independent appraisals
of their investment performance. They have also found themselves working
within fewer constitutional restrictions.
Consider the evolving policy of trustee involvement in setting investment
allocations: Of the 171 systems participating in the surveys in both 1992 and
1996, 128 maintained their practice of having the board set asset allocations,
and 24 continued without it doing so. But the adopters far outnumbered the
droppers: 14 boards embraced allocation setting, while only 5 abandoned
the practice. The weight ofopinion among the thousands of investment pro-
fessionals, pension trustees, and public officials who operate the systems,
it seems, is to lodge these critical decisions squarely within the governing
board.
Consider as well the diminishing constitutional restrictions. From 1991
to 1994, a quarter of the retirement systems faced such limits, but in 1996
the fraction dropped below a fifth. Indiana voters had rejected measures to
abolish the state's total prohibition of equity investing as recently as 1990,
but they finally took the equity leap in 1996. The two others states with com-
plete proscriptions on equity investing at that time-South Carolina, and
West Virginia-also eliminated their exclusions in 1996. These decisions re-
flected growing public approval in the mid-1990s ofequity markets and their
rich returns, or at least less fear about their downside risks.
Other state restrictions have been less limiting: Kansas, for example,
maintained a century-old prohibition against ownership of bank stocks. But
even these lesser constraints have been lightened. From 1992 to 1994, 20 to
25 percent of the pension funds faced a constitutional or statutory equity
cap of 35 percent or less (below generally recommended asset allocations at
the time), but by 1996 the fraction offunds facing this cap dropped to 14
percent. Similarly, half of the funds faced equity limits of 50 percent until
1996, but in that year less than a third still reported such a ceiling.
If past trends are predictive of future movements, the recent past sug-
gests that state prohibitions will diminish further, more boards will fix allo-
cations, and outside appraisals will become the standard. Since these direc-
tions in the aggregate are the product of thousands of separate decisions by
hundreds of retirement systems over seven years, they suggest what emer-
gent best practices are believed to be among those who are most responsible
for-and most on the front line of-managing the funds. The rising prac-
tices may still not be ideal, but they are certainly road tested.
The most important pension decisions driving investment returns and
risks are the allocations of assets among the major classes of investment (in-
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vestment allocations explain as much as 90 percent of the variance in the
returns on assets; Brinson, Hood, and Beebower 1986; Brinson, Singer, and
Beebower, 1991). The migration ofsuch decisions into the board signifies its
growing prowess in the process, and it also implies that allocation decisions
are better vested in system trustees than legislative bodies or executive offi-
cials.The trustees are closer to the action and are therefore better positioned
to know what actions are required. This principle is consistent with the wide-
spread practice among companies ofdevolving decisions, responsibility, and
accountability whenever feasible to those who are in closest contact with
the customer (McKenzie and Lee 1998). Trustees are also shielded from mo-
mentary political winds that may be optimal for the state or municipality
but suboptimal for the pension beneficiaries, such as economically targeted
or social screened investments. This principle is consistent with the equally
widespread practice among corporate directors of resisting demands from
specific investors for particular changes that may be optimal for them now
but not for shareholder value in the long run.
But the trend lines also suggest that allocation decisions are better re-
tained by the overseers than delegated to the front-line investment man-
agers. The publicized bankruptcies of several public and private entities be-
cause of excessive leverage during the early 1990s and the near collapse of
Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 stand as stark reminders of how in-
sufficient oversight can tempt some money managers too allocate too much
money to prospects with too little security. As the trusted agents of the sys-
tem beneficiaries and public taxpayers, trustees are relatively disinclined,
it seems, to delegate further agency on behalf of their principals. Some
law markers remain gun-shy as well. "Between Orange County and the Bar-
ings failure," offered Richard A. Eckstrom, South Carolina's state treasurer,
"legislators are wary of any precipitous change" (Wayne 1995).
The relative constancy of the governing board size-eight trustees give
or take three throughout this period - implies a curvilinear optimum some-
where in this range. By way of inference from research on the performance
of units ranging from product teams to corporate boards, too few mem-
bers is to deny the board the diverse experience, expertise, and wisdom that
make for good decisions, but too many is also to undermine its communi-
cation, consensus, and responsibility that also make for effective actions.
A governing body of five members is suboptimal, and so too is a board of
twenty-five (Yermack 1996).
The widespread inclusion of elected participants also confirms the desir-
ability of seating representatives from the ranks in the boardroom. In 1990,
only 31 percent of the state and local boards included no elected members,
and by 1996 this had declined to 27 percent. The main concept at work is un-
doubtedly that the retirement funds ultimately belong to plan members, and
their delegates should be present at the creation. Representatives do not
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dominate the boardroom-only a third of the typical board are so elected-
but their presence in the room ensures that their aspirations and fears will be
well voiced ifnot always fully heard. After the Challenger space shuttle dis-
aster onJanuary 28,1986, the investigating commission recommended that
nonflying astronauts be placed in management positions since they bring
not only flight experience but also "a keen appreciation of operations and
flight safety" (Presidential Commission 1986).
Retirement System Investment Strategies
State and local retirement system investment strategies are intended to opti-
mize assets holdings within the bounds of prudent risk, but system trustees
and investment managers have adopted varying ways ofdoing so. Some have
chosen to focus on short-term market trends, others on the longer term;
some prefer equities, others bonds; some stay strictly at home, others dabble
offshore.
We focus on five retirement system investment strategies: (1) long-term
investing, (2) tactical investing based on near-term considerations; (3) man-
agement venue-the proportion of funds that are managed in-house or by
outside investment companies; (4) equities versus fixed-income-the allo-
cation offunds between stocks and bonds; and (5) international holdings-
whether some funds are placed in international stocks and bonds. Long-
term and tactical investing are gauged with a survey question that asks if
the retirement system asset allocation is "long-term (not often changed with
varying economic conditions)" or "tactically set (i.e., changed often with
varying economic conditions)." Equities include company stocks, real estate
equities, and other forms ofequity holding. Fixed-income includes govern-
ment and corporate bonds, real estate mortgages, and other fixed-income
instruments.
Public retirement plans are placing greater responsibility and more ac-
countability in the hands of trustees, and they and their appointed invest-
ment mangers in turn are evidently willing to take greater risks in the pur-
suit of higher returns, as seen in Table 3. They are less tactical and more
long term in investment style. Compared with the investment approaches
at the start the 1990s, by the latter half of the decade the pension funds
were placing more of their assets in equities and moving more of their as-
sets abroad. They were also increasingly relying upon external investment
professionals to manage the portfolio. Equity holdings in 1990 typically con-
stituted a third of the total, but by 1996 they had reached half. International
holding in 1990 averaged 2.1 percent but by 1996 had risen to 8.6 percent.
Half of the systems in 1990 placed all their funds under external manage-
ment, but by 1996 more than three-quarters were doing so.
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TABLE 3. Retirement System Investment Strategies, 1990-96
Investment strategy 1990 1991 1992 1994 1996
Long-term asset allocation n.a. n.a. 74.8 82.4 90.0
Tactically set asset allocation n.a. n.a 16.3 14.4 11.7
Funds placing all funds under external
management 49.5 66.3 75.0 72.7 78.3
Funds placing all equities under external
management (of those funds with at
least some equities) 57.4 73.8 82.9 80.7 85.0
Percentage of funds that manage all
equities internally (of those funds with
at least some equities) 28.7 16.0 10.6 11.5 7.7
Percentage of assets in equities 33.4 36.0 41.7 45.1 50.1
Percentage of assets in fixed income 47.3 46.7 50.0 43.2 41.5
Percentage of assets in international
equities 1.56 1.74 2.34 3.70 6.85
Percentage of assets in international
fixed income 0.57 0.59 0.82 1.28 1.72
Source: Authors' calculations.
California and South Carolina Retirement Systems
Two pension funds-the California Pubic Employees' Retirement System
(Calpers) and the South Carolina Retirement System-usefully illustrate
much of the range in governance polices and investment strategies. Exami-
nation of them provides tangible examples of what nationwide trends mean
when translated into the practices of specific funds. And comparison of
them reveals how distinctive governance policies and investment strategies
appear to yield distinctive risks and returns on the assets.
As seen in Table 4, the governing board for South Carolina consists of
5 trustees, all plan participants; the governing board for Calpers consists of
13 members, 10 of whom are participants. Consistent with state and local
system trends as a whole, the size and structure of the two boards are vir-
tually unchanged over the six-year period. Their respective board sizes and
structures are markedly different, however, and so too are their investment
styles.
The thirteen members of the Calpers board include six elected repre-
sentatives, four appointed trustees, and three "ex officio" members. Two of
the elected representatives are elected by all Calpers participants, and one
each is elected by four other constituencies: (1) employees ofCalifornia state
agencies and public universities, (2) employees of local governments that
contract with Calpers for retirement benefits, (3) employees ofloeal school
systems that contract with Calpers, and (4) retired employees. The gover-
140 Michael Useem and David Hess
TABLE 4. South Carolina and California Retirement Systems. 1991 and 1996
South Carolina Retirement System 1991 1996
Governance policies
Investment restrictions in constitution yes yes
Independent performance evaluation n.a. yes
Board engagement in investment strategies
Board sets allocations n.a. no
Board directly responsible for investments no no
Board composition
Number of trustees 5 5
Plan participants as trustees 5 5
Elected trustees 0 0
Investment strategies
Long-term investing of assets n.a. yes
Tactical investing of assets n.a. no
Equities as % of total assets 0 0
External management of all assets no no
International investment of some assets no no
Assets under management ($ B) $9.09 $14.6
California Public Employees' Retirement System (Calpers) 1991 1996
Governance policies
Investment restrictions in constitution no no
Independent performance evaluation n.a. yes
Board engagement in investment strategies
Board sets allocations n.a. yes
Board directly responsible for investments no no
Board composition
Number of trustees 13 13
Plan participants as trustees 11 10
Elected trustees 6 6
Investment strategies
Long-term investing of assets n.a. yes
Tactical investing of assets n.a. no
Equities as % of total assets 42.7 60.6
External management of all assets no no
International investment of some assets yes yes
Assets under management ($ B) $67.9 $100.7
Source: Authors' calculations.
nor appoints two members (one an elected official of a public agency and
one an official of a life insurer), and the Speaker of the Assembly and the
Senate Rules Committee appoint another. The four ex officio members are
the state treasurer, controller, director of personnel administration, and a
member of the state personnel board.l
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TABLE 5. Calpers Internal Investment Allocation Limits, 1991-96
Percentage alwwed 1991 1992 1994 1996
Stocks 55 55 50 63
Real estate 10 8 8 7
Corporate bonds 26 37 37 24
Foreign investments n.a. 16 16 24
Calpers faces no legislative restrictions, but the board does set allocation
'caps, and the board has changed them in consonance with nationwide pub-
lic pension trends, as seen in Table 5. Between 1991 and 1996, California
increased its permissible equity cap from 55 to 63 percent, and its foreign
cap from 16 to 24 percent. Though never quite rubbing against its ceilings,
Calpers had come increasingly close: in 1991 it placed 43 percent in stock
when it could have allocated 55 percent; in 1996 it put 61 percent in stock
at a time the limit had been set at 63 percent.2
The South Carolina Retirement System could invest none of its assets in
stock due to a 1895 constitutional restriction arising from a scandal in which
the governor and other public officials swindled the state out of railroad
stock. At the end of1996, however, South Carolina amended its constitution
to permit equity investing, though implementing legislation did not pass
until mid-1998 and the system can only increase its equity holdings by 10
percentage points per year until it reaches a cap of 40 percent. Even prior
to this legislative uncapping, however, South Carolina investment managers
had found ways of enhancing their risks and returns on the fixed-income
side, displaying an above average penchant for corporate over government
bonds and for single-A over triple-A notes. The ratio ofcorporate to govern-
ment bonds, for instance, averaged 0.99 in 1996 for all systems, but for South
Carolina the ratio reached 1.23. Yet even then its lower than average returns
had left the fund underfunded-by $1.3 billion in 1998, at a time when its
assets totaled $17.8 billion-which added an annual burden of$126 million
on South Carolina's taxpayers (Rehfeld 1996; Wayne 1995; Sponhour 1998;
Parker 1999).3
Governance and Investments
When public retirement system trustees set allocation policies, and when
their investment managers pick stocks and bonds within those allocations,
a plan's trustees and managers are jointly giving shape and content to the
fund's investment strategy. That strategy in turn drives and determines their
investment's risks and returns. The governance policies of a pension fund
can thus be key to its performance: designed well, investment risks will be
appropriate and returns will be superior; structured poorly, more tax reve-
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nues may be required to make up for the otherwise avoidable and predict-
able shortfalls. Good governance, then, stands between a fund's success in
servicing the public and its failure to do so.
As a case in point, the California Public Employees' Retirement System
includes a million participants and more than two thousand participating
state and local agencies, and its board convenes on the third Wednesday of
every month to ensure that the fund is doing the right thing for them. Board
members also guide the fund's investment strategies through four commit-
tees:
Strategic Planning Committee. Oversees the strategic planning process, includ-
ing the selection of consultants
Investment Committee. Reviews investment transactions and investment policy
and strategy
RealEstate Subcommittee ofthe Investment Committee. Develops real estate invest-
ment portfolio strategies
Policy Subcommittee of the Investment Committee. Reviews and recommends re-
visions in investment practices
The time required of trustees for exercising responsible oversight is by no
means trivial: Calpers board members typically spend four days per month
in meetings. Their compensation, however, is virtually trivial: they receive
but $100 per meeting day. The board and its committees oversee the work
of 2,500 employees, including a staff of 65 charged with the "successful in-
vestment" of Calpers' assets. Decisions on specific equity and fixed-income
investments are taken both by the staff and a set of external equity man-
agers under the general guidance of the chief investment officer (formerly
Sheryl Pressler, whose prior experience included management of$8 billion
in retirement funds for McDonnell Douglas Corporation).
California's investment strategy led to a seven-year average rate of return
that exceeded that of South Carolina by 82 basis points (Table 6). On the
other hand, it also accepted greater risks in doing so: the standard devia-
tion in the annual rate of return across this period stood at 5.24 for Calpers
but only 3.05 for South Carolina. Both systems, however, underperformed
the average of all pension funds, though both also assured below average
year-by-year variability in their returns. State and local pension funds taken
together on average underperformed one of the standard benchmarks for
equity investing-the Standard and Poor's index of 500 large companies-
but they out-performed three other benchmarks-long-term government
bonds, long-term corporate bonds, and U.S. treasury bills.
To examine the extent to which the governance policies shape investment
strategies among the retirement systems, we focus on a single year-1992-
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TABLE 6. Rates of Return on Investments, South Carolina, California and all State
and Local Retirement Systems, 1990-96
Public pensions 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Mean S.D.
South Carolina 10.57 10.15 9.89 9.77 8.83 15.40 5.00 9.94 3.05
California 7.70 6.50 12.50 14.40 2.50 16.40 15.30 10.76 5.24
All systems 6.14 15.46 9.21 11.64 1.94 19.64 13.66 lLlO 5.93
Benchmarks
S&P 500 -3.2 30.6 7.7 10.0 1.3 37.4 23.1 15.3 15.3
Long-term
gov. bonds 6.2 19.3 8.1 18.2 -7.8 31.7 -0.9 10.7 13.4
Long-term
corp. bonds 6.8 19.9 9.4 13.2 -5.8 27.2 1.4 10.3 ILl
U.S. Treasury
Bills 7.8 5.6 3.5 2.9 3.9 5.6 5.2 4.93 1.66
Source: Benchmark data from Ibbotson Associates (1998). Public pension data from authors
calculations; rates of return for 1988 to 1992 are taken from the 1992 survey; rates of return for
1993 and 1994 are from the 1994 survey; and rates of return for 1995 and 1996 are from the
1996 survey (which asked for time-weighted returns).
and we concentrate on six governance policies that are expected to have
greatest impact: (1) state investment restrictions, (2) independent perfor-
mance reviews, (3) board-set asset allocations, (4) board responsible for in-
vestments, (5) the size of the board, and (6) the fraction of the board that
is plan participants. We draw upon a regression from a companion analysis
offive investment strategies-equity investing, long-term investing, tactical
investing, reliance on external fund mangers, and international investing-
on these governance factors (Useem and Mitchell 1999).
As reported in Table 7, the configuration of a retirement system's gov-
ernance is seen to have a significant bearing of where it places its assets.
Public ,pensions with state-imposed investment restrictions allocated less
to equities and were more long term and less tactical in picking stocks;
those with independent performance reviews allocated more to equities and
more abroad, and focused more on the long term. Those whose boards set
asset allocations are more long term in investment style, and those with
larger boards favor stocks, inside managers, and international opportuni-
ties. Taken together, these factors explain a substantial share of the diversity
observed in the plans' investment strategies. More than a fifth (22.6 per-
cent) of the variation in the proportion placed in the stock market, for ex-
ample, is explained by how the plans are governed. If a fund added an inde-
pendent performance appraisal, for instance, by that change in governance
alone it was likely to have increased its equity holdings by 14 percentage
points. Similar patterns are found in analogous calculations for 1994 and
TABLE 7. Regression of Investment Strategies on Governance Policies, 1992
Governance policy Equities as Long-term Tactical All external Some int'l.
(standard errors in parentheses) % of total investing investing management investing
Investment restrictions -7.50 (2.35)** 1.41 (.48) ** -1.10 (.52)* -0.43 (.40) -0.24 (.33)
Independent performance evaluation 13.67 (2.50) ** 1.58 (.40) ** 0.11 (.44) 0.62 (.42) 1.46 (.38) **
Board purview
Board sets asset allocations 4.65 (2.71) 2.23 (.44) ** -0.35 (.45) 0.58 (.44) -0.36 (.38)
Board responsible for investments 1.44 (2.15) 0.19 (.40) -0.61 (.38) -0.07 (.36) 0.04 (.30)
Board composition/size:
Number of trustees 0.71 (0.31)* 0.19 (.06) 0.00 (.05) -0.12 (.05)* 0.10 (.04) *
Plan participants as % of trustees -3.56 (4.03) 0.04 (.72) 0.22 (.72) -1.40 (.71)* 0.71 (.58)
Elected trustees as % of trustees -4.43 (4.06) -1.02 (.75) 1.47 (.72)* 0.86 (.67) -0.23 (.57)
R 2 or log-likelihood/concordant pairs 0.226** 188.4/83.4% ** 203/83.4% * 217/76.7%* 293/60.4% **
Source: Authors' calculations.
**p <.01; *P<.05; regression based on 253, 241, 241, 215, and 235 retirement systems respectively; linear regression for equities as % of
total; logistic regression for other variables.
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TABLE 8. Regression Equity Indexing on Governance Policies, 1996
Goverrw.nce policy
(standard errors in parentheses)
Investment restrictions
Independent performance evaluation
Board purview:
Board sets asset allocations
Board responsible for investments
Board composition/size:
Number of trustees
Plan participants as % of trustees
Elected trustees as % of trustees
R 2 or log-likelihood/concordant pairs
Some equity
indexing
-0.82 (.43)*
1.04 (.60) *
0.13 (0.49)
0.87 (0.31) **
-0.00 (0.04)
0.84 (0.65)
0.08 (0.62)
253/64.53% **
Source: Authors' calculations.
** p<.01; *P<.05; regression are based on 203 retirement systems.
1996, signifying the enduring impact of these governance policies on invest-
ment strategies.4
Another key investment strategy-the placement of at least some equi-
ties in an index (further considered in the next section) -was not gauged in
the earlier years, but we do have an assessment in 1996. We create a simple
measure ofwhether a system had placed any of its assets in an equity index,
and Table 8 reveals that investment restrictions have a predictably negative
impact. Pensions that use independent performance appraisals, however,
are more likely to invest in an equity index, as are funds whose trustees are
directly responsible for investments.
Governance and Activism
Some s~ate and local pension funds concern themselves not only with their
own governance but also with that of the companies in which they invest.
California, New York, Wisconsin, and other state systems have long led
the "shareholder rights" -or perhaps better dubbed- "shareholder power"
revolution. They have called for consistently stronger shareholder returns,
and they have also sought to ensure robust growth by pressing for annual
shareholder elections of all company directors (rather than having direc-
tors served staggered terms), company avoidance of takeover defenses such
as poison pills, and greater independence of company directors from top
management. The retirement systems have pressured companies to make
their governance systems more shareholder-friendly through informal dia-
logue with management, by voting against directors and their proposals, and
by publicizing the worst performing companies in their portfolios (Useem
1996,1998; Tsui 1999).
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TABLE 9. Regression of Investor Activism on Governance, 1996 Policies
Governance Policy
(standard errors in parentheses)
Investment restrictions
Independent performance eval.
Board sets asset allocations
Board responsible for investments
Number of trustees
Plan participants as % of trustees
Elected trustees as % of trustees
Other factors
Size offund (In of assets)
% of asset in equities
% of assets in equity index
Log-likelihood/concordant pairs
Investor a£tiuism
first regression
-0.76 (0.67)
1.27 (1.10)
0.16 (0.84)
0.75 (0.43) *
0.06 (0.06)
-1.23 (0.96)
2.54 (0.93) **
161.6/79.9% **
Investor a£tiuism
Second regression
-0.18 (0.75)
-0.56 (1.38)
0.76(1.02)
0.84 (0.53)
-0.09 (0.08)
-1.77(1.28)
3.03 (1.05) **
0.70 (0.16) **
0.08 (0.03) **
-O.oI (0.02)
121.2/84.5% **
Source: Authors' calculations.
** p<.01; *P<.05; logistic regression based 181 retirement systems.
Investor activism should therefore be viewed as yet another investment
strategy that pension trustees embrace to ensure that their participants en-
joy the risks and returns to which they are entitled. Rather than just pick-
ing companies in which to invest, the public pensions pick on companies in
which they have already invested.
A significant proportion of many public funds were indexing by the mid-
1990s, and this may lead to more activism as well. Close to half-45 per-
cent-of the systems in 1996 had placed at least some assets in an index, and
the typical fund had indexed 16 percent of it assets. For these holdings, in-
vestment managers are left with no choice once they have picked the index,
and activism for them can send a message to management when active buy-
ing or selling of a company's stock is no longer feasible.
The 1996 survey of state and local pensions asked, "Has your system ac-
tively participated in corporate governance issues by voting against manage-
ment on annual proxy statements or otherwise encouraging companies you
hold stock in to change their management activities?" Almost one in five-
40 out of 21O-answered in the affirmative. Drawing on nearly the same
set of governance factors examined earlier for their impact on investment
strategies, we examine the predictors of investor activism as reported in
Table 8. The first regression includes only the governance policies, while the
second brings in three other factors presumed to foster activism as well: the
size of system assets (larger funds have greater resources with which to sup-
port activist campaigns), and the proportion offunds in equities and equity
indexes. Focusing on the second regression in which the governance effects
can be seen apart from the impact of other factors, we see that investment
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restrictions and independent performance evaluations have no impact, and
the same holds for the board's investment responsibilities. Nor is the board
size important, but its composition is. The greater the relative presence of
elected trustees, the more likely is the fund to be activist. We also note that
large funds and those with more of their assets in equities are drawn toward
activism, although indexing is seen to have no independent effect.
Governance and Targeting
Voices opposing the formation of a national investment board have con-
tended that such a body could not resist the temptation to favor companies
that are of national interest but not beneficiary interest. Such an oversight
board might prefer U.S. companies over foreign opportunities, labor-
friendly firms over antilabor firms, and tobacco-free corporations over
cigarette makers. While such preferencing may make good sense for the
country, it may also be a poor choice for participants who want the assets
optimized for themselves rather than the nation. Including any political or
social criteria in the selection of investment targets would introduce, by this
line of argument, untoward bias in participant risks and rewards (Watson
1994; Marr, Nofsinger, and Trimble 1993).
The investing experience of state and local systems in this area is infor-
mative, for it suggests that here too governance matters. In 1996, the survey
asked the systems whether they have "prohibitions against direct or indirect
investments in specific types of companies," such as those doing business
with Northern Ireland or manufacturing tobacco. It also inquired whether
a fraction of their portfolio is "targeted or directed in-state for economic
development purposes." The number of systems engaged in either form of
directed investing was modest: in 1996, twenty-eight engaged in social limit-
ing and fourteen in economic targeting (the fraction of assets targeted eco-
nomically ranged from 0.05 percent to 12 percent, with Calpers anchor-
ing the high end). Paralleling the analysis for investor activism, Table 10
presents a regression of these social and economic measures on the gover-
nance factors.
We have already seen that retirement systems with independent perfor-
mance evaluations and larger boards invest a larger proportion of their as-
sets outside the United States (Table 7). By implication, a national board
with these governance characteristics is less likely to favor domestic invest-
ments for purely political purposes. On social limiting and economic target-
ing, however, governance is seen to make no difference. Larger funds are
less likely to socially limit and more likely to economically target, but the
governance factors have no direct impact once the size of the fund is taken
into account.
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TABLE 10. Regression of Investment Targeting on Governance, 1996 Policies
GlYUernance policy (standard errors in parentheses)
Investment restrictions
Independent performance evaluation
Board sets asset allocations
Board responsible for investments
Number of trustees
Plan participants as % of trustees
Elected trustees as % of trustees
Other factors
Size offund (In of assets)
% of asset in equities
% of assets in equity index
Log-likelihood/concordant pairs
Social limiting
0.16 (.S4)
0.74 (.88)
0.28 (.83)
-0.04 (.47)
-0.02 (.08)
-1.09 (.9S)
0.S3 (1.01)
-0.19 (.ll)*
0.00 (.02)
-0.Dl (.01)
142.6/87.7%
Economic targeting
0.12 (0.23)
-0.17 (0.31)
0.06 (0.27)
-0.17 (0.18)
0.03 (0.03)
0.20 (0.37)
0.14 (0.36)
0.12 (.04)
0.04 (.01)
0.00 (.00)
.10S**
Source: Authors' calculations.
** p<.01; *P<.05; regressions based on 203 retirement systems. Social targeting refers to pro-
hibitions on investments in specific types of companies; economic targeting refers to the in-
vestment of some funds in-state for economic development.
Governance Matters More
State and local retirement systems have been moving toward greater open-
ness and accountability. They are less constrained by state-imposed restric-
tions, and their trustees are taking greater responsibility for investment
allocations. More are using professional investment services, and more are
drawing independent performance evaluations. Their boards are little
changing in composition, but their trustees are changing in attitude. So too
are the legislative authorities and public opinions that ultimately shape their
governance policies.
These changes can be seen as part of a nationwide fascination with the
remarkable performance of the U.S. bull market during the 1990s. In the
aftermath of Indiana's vote to end its constitutional prohibition on equities,
an editorial in an Indianapolis newspaper noted the obvious: as the state re-
tirement system began to invest in stocks and, as a result, hopefully raised its
then modest returns from 7.3 percent to evenjust 8.5 percent, it would lead
to a $70 million to $100 million tax-cut windfall for the people of Indiana
(Indianapolis Star 1997).
The way states and municipalities chose to govern their pension funds
has evident bearing on what they do with the funds. Whether they invest
in stocks or bonds, tactically or for the long run, domestically or interna-
tionally, is partly a predictable product of how they are governed. So too
are the decisions on whether to manage the investments inside or through
outsourcing, and on whether to take an activist stance or remain passive.
Legislative restrictions, independent evaluations, and trustee compositions
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TABLE 11. The Most Important Single Determinants of Key Investment Strategies
Investment strategy
Allocation of funds into equities
Placement of funds in equity indexes
Long-term investing
Tactical investing
External management of portfolio
At least some international investing
Investor activism
Social limiting
Economic targeting
Source: Authors' tabulations.
Most important governance determinant
Independent performance evaluation
Board responsible for investments
Board sets asset allocations
Trustees elected by plan participants
and investment restrictions
Number of trustees
Independent performance evaluation
Trustees elected by plan participants
None
None
all affect how and where retiree monies are invested. And, given that legis-
latures are loosening their grips and capital markets are opening, pension
governance is becoming more important than ever, for those who govern
now have more impact than ever before on how their assets are invested.
National Policy Implications
From the recent history of state and local pensions we can suggest that the
behavior of a national system that invests in the market will depend on how
its governance is configured. The most important single governance deter-
minants of key investment strategies by public pensions are identified in
Table 11, and although inferring national actions from regional experience
is always hazardous, it is better to draw on the public pension experience
that we do have than on no data at all.
If a national governing board is established to oversee the investment of
social security funds, the state and local retirement system evidence would
predict that the body would and should be
composed of eight to nine trustees, a third of whom are elected by par-
ticipants;
unconstrained by investment restrictions;
directly responsible for setting investment allocations.
We can anticipate that state and local boards will continue a slow but sure
drive toward more equity investing and more international holdings, and
if a federal governing body is created to supervise the investment of social
security funds, trends in the state and local evidence would predict that the
body would and should:
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place most if not all of the funds under active management by outside
investment companies;
eschew tactical, short-term investment styles and favor long-term strate-
gies;
allocate at least half of the funds to U.S. equities;
invest close to a tenth of the funds offshore.
Since state and local retirement systems are moving toward less state re-
striction and more independent appraisal, we anticipate that the systems are
likely to move still more assets into equities and more outside the United
States during the years ahead. Again, if the Congress were to establish a gov-
erning entity to preside over the investment of social security funds, and if
it took its cues from trends in public pension governance, we could expect
similar trends in its investment strategies. This might be marked above all
by a rising favoritism toward equities over fixed-income alternatives, and a
declining preference for a purely American portfolio.
The composition of a national board would appear to be a primary con-
sideration in shaping whether it becomes activist of not. Whether it should
be activist is a matter for Congress to decide. Most company executives
are sure to be opposed, viewing an activist federal investment board as just
another thorn in their side. Many investors and plan participants, however,
are sure to be supportive, seeing the federal role as one more prod for
better corporate performance-and thus larger retirement benefits. But if
it is activism that Congress prefers, the evidence from the state and local
experience is that electing trustees will take the fund down the activist trail.
As a cautionary note, a governance scheme is ultimately only as good as
those board trustees and investment managers who enact it. The quality
of leadership counts as much here as anywhere, and the performance of a
national system will be critically dependent on the capabilities of those ap-
pointed to oversee and operate it.5
Notes
1. Board members are profiled at <www.calpers.ca.gov>.
2. By the end of 1998, Calpers had raised its equity fraction to 69 percent of the
$151 billion under management, and its international holdings to 24 percent.
3. Indiana and West Virginia joined South Carolina in 1996 in ending their pro-
hibitions on equity investing.
4. For "equities as percentage of total," investment restrictions have a negative
effect in both 1994 and 1996, and independent performance evaluation and number
of trustees have positive impacts. For "tactical investing," however, the regressions
coefficients are not statistically significant for the later years. For "all external man-
agement," the number of trustees has negative effects for both years (though is not
statistically significant in 1994), while board setting asset allocation has a positive
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effect. For "some international investing," independent performance evaluation and
number of trustees are positive and statistically significant. These regression results
are available upon request to the first author <useem@wharton.upenn.edu>.
5. As a case in point, consider Grinnell College, one of the country's smallest col-
leges but also one of its richest. Grinnell's endowment in mid-1998 stood at $1.02
billion, not large by comparison with the endowments of some leading universities,
but near the top on per capita wealth. Much of its recent affluence-and thus the
exceptional benefits received by its participants-can be traced to the investment
savvy of its trustees. Joseph F. Rosenfield, a Des Moines businessman, and Warren E.
Buffett, an Omaha investment manager, had long served as Grinnell trustees: Rosen-
field hadjoined the board in 1941, and he recruited Buffett in 1968. In 1968, Grinnell
College invested in a new firm being built by one of its graduates, Robert Noyce,
named Intel. The college also bought $17 shares in Berkshire Hathaway that were
later to become valued at $17,000. Rosenfield and Buffett had spearheaded a trustee
drive to grow the endowment through such investments, and in doing so they trans-
formed $11 million in college assets at the end of the 1960s into a hundred-times
larger endowment three decades later. By the early 1990s, the Grinnell endowment
was outperforming the S&P 500 stock index by more than five points (18.7 percent in
1992-93 versus 13.6 percent), and in 1998, Grinnell College achieved an investment
return of38 percent, far exceeding the performance of most mutual fund managers.
Regardless of trustees policies and composition, trustee leadership also evidently
matters (Siebert 1994, 1998; Wall StreetJourna1l999).
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